A Bell-type inequality is defined as an inequality of the type 0⩽L⩽1,where L is a linear combination with real coefficients of probabilities p i and joint probabilities p ij ,p ijk ,...,p l ,...,n corresponding to n events. A general theorem on the validity of such inequalities in correspondence to physical assumptions about commutativity or noncommutativity is given. Examples and possible physical applications are discussed.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 132-160, April 2022. Autonomic nervous system activity is a fundamental component of emotional responding. It is not clear, however, whether positive emotional states are associated with differential ANS reactivity. To address this issue, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 120 articles, measuring ANS activity during 11 elicited positive emotions, namely amusement, attachment love, awe, contentment, craving, excitement, gratitude, joy, nurturant love, pride, and sexual desire. We identified a widely dispersed collection of studies. Univariate (...) results indicated that positive emotions produce no or weak and highly variable increases in ANS reactivity. However, the limitations of work to date – which we discuss – mean that our conclusions should be treated as empirically grounded hypotheses that future research should validate. (shrink)

Recent research observed a sensitive window, at about 14 years of age, in the acculturation rates of Chinese immigrants to Canada. Tapping an online sample ofusimmigrants, we tested these relationships in a broader population and explored connections with new potentially causally related variables: formal education, language ability and contact with heritage-culture and mainstream United States individuals, both now and at immigration. While we found that acculturation decreased with age at immigration and increased with years in theus, we did not observe (...) a similar sensitive window. We also present an exploratory path analysis, exposing the relationships in our sample between acculturation and the variables above. The novel relationships documented here can improve theorising about this rich and complex empirical phenomenon. (shrink)

The undoing hypothesis proposes that positive emotions serve to undo sympathetic arousal related to negative emotions and stress. However, a recent qualitative review challenged the undoing effect by presenting conflicting results. To address this issue quantitatively, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 16 studies ( N = 1,220; 72 effect sizes) measuring sympathetic recovery during elicited positive emotions and neutral conditions. Findings indicated that in most cases, positive emotions did not speed sympathetic recovery compared to neutral conditions. However, when a (...) composite index of cardiovascular reactivity was used, undoing effects were evident. Our findings suggest the need for further work on the functions of positive emotions. (shrink)

We examined the universality of the curse of knowledge by investigating it in a unique cross-cultural sample; a nomadic Nilo-Saharan pastoralist society in East Africa, the Turkana. Forty Turkana children were asked eight factual questions and asked to predict how widely-known those facts were among their peers. To test the effect of their knowledge, we taught children the answers to half of the questions, while the other half were unknown. Based on findings suggesting the bias’s universality, we predicted that children (...) would estimate that more of their peers would know the answers to the questions that were taught versus the unknown questions. We also predicted that with age children would become less biased by their knowledge. In contrast, we found that only Turkana males were biased by their knowledge when inferring their peers’ perspectives, and the bias did not change with age. We discuss the implications of these findings. (shrink)

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection finds application far outside biology, for which it was originally invented. Its consequences for science proved far-going, influencing practically every field from thermodynamics to the humanities. While acting on biological systems, the Darwinian mechanism is a source of progress and the local-scale abandonment of the universe’s general tendency towards chaos. However, observations of changes taking place in selection-exposed organisms show that evolutionary success requires some essential limitations. The application of this (...) reasoning to social evolution may appear thought-provoking: stable evolution requires not only intense selection but also a conservative approach to ideas. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to contribute to the debate on the foundations of semantics and pragmatics by developing an Austinian alternative to the Gricean programme. The Gricean approach has been criticised by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone who claim that most of the interpretive effects that are usually accounted for as inferentially recognized aspects of meaning are in fact determined by grammar. I argue, however, that it is the Austinian perspective rather than the extended-grammar outlook, that constitutes a (...) genuine alternative to the Gricean programme. Viewed from the Austinian perspective, using language is a social practice that consists of performing conventional speech acts: acts done conforming to a convention. Unlike the Griceans and the proponents of the extended-grammar outlook, however, the Austinians assume that following a convention is not an algorithmic procedure, but a socially controlled process that involves interactional negotiation. They claim, namely, that each language convention — phatic, rhetic, illocutionary, rhetorical, procedural, etc. — is a lineage of reproduced precedents that put some constraints on what can be regarded as saying and doing the same, but underdetermine the exact properties of its new members. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at providing an account of an indirect mechanism responsible for establishing one's power to issue biding directive acts; second, it is intended as a case for an externalist account of illocutionary interaction. The mechanism in question is akin to what David Lewis calls presupposition accommodation: a rule-governed process whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted to make the utterance acceptable; the main idea behind the proposed account is that the (...) indirect power-establishing mechanism involves the use of imperative sentences that function as presupposition triggers and as such can trigger off the accommodating change of the context of their utterance. According to the externalist account of illocutionary interaction, in turn, at least in some cases the illocutionary force of an act is determined by the audience's uptake rather than by what the speaker intends or believes; in particular, at least in some cases it is the speaker, not her audience, who is invited to accommodate the presupposition of her act. The paper has three parts. The first one defines a few terms — i.e., an “illocution”, a “biding act”, the “audience's uptake” and an “Austinian presupposition” — thereby setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The second part formulates and discusses the main problem of the present paper: what is the source of the agent's power to perform binding directive acts? The third part offers an account of the indirect power-establishing mechanism and discusses its externalist implications. (shrink)

Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions embraces papers focused on the performative dimension of language. While all texts in the volume recognize speech primarily as a type of action, the collection is indicative of the multifaceted nature of J.L. Austin’s original reflection, which invited many varied research programmes. The problems addressed in the volume are discussed with reference to data culled from natural conversation, mediated political discourse, law, and literary language, and include normativity, e.g. types of norms operative in speech (...) acts, speaker’s intentions and commitments, speaker-addressee coordination, but also speech actions in discursive practice, in literal and non-literal language, performance of irony, presupposition, and meaningful significant silence. -/- Contributors are: Brian Ball, Cristina Corredor, Anita Fetzer, Milada Hirschová, Dennis Kurzon, Marcin Matczak, Marina Sbisà, Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka, Maciej Witek, and Mateusz Włodarczyk. (shrink)

The author starts with the assumption that a popular idea, according to which a true sentence corresponds with reality, is adequate. Therefore, any adequate theory of truth has to account for it. It turns out, however, that it is the epistemic conception, not the correspondence one, that meets such a demand. In order to justify his claim, the author discusses Jacek J. Jadacki's theory of truth. Roughly speaking, the theory in question states that if a given sentence refers to a (...) certain state of affairs - that function a the sentence's semantic value - then the sentence is true if and only if the relevant state of affairs holds. In short, the theory defines the truth of a given sentence in terms of the holding of the state of affairs to which the sentence refers. It remains to be explained, therefore, what it is, for a given state of affairs to hold. The author considers three possible accounts of the holding of the state of affairs. According to the first one, the sentence's semantic value is either a mental representation or an ideal entity grasped in the subjective episode of understanding. Such a mental or ideal state of affairs holds if it has its real counterpart. The second ac-count is based on the idea that real states of affairs constitutes a subclass of all describeable states of affairs. A given state of affairs holds if and only if it belongs to this special class. According to the third interpretation, a holding state of affairs is the semantic value of a true sentence. The author argues that the first account gives rise to the suspect question on the nature of either the relation of mental representation or the relation of exemplification. The second account, in turn, seems to require a controversial assumption that existence is a property. Taking into account those and similar problems, we have no alternative but to embrace the third option, according to which a given state of affairs holds because it is the semantic value of a true sentence. The truth of a sentence, in turn, has to be conceived as its rational acceptability. (shrink)

Der Band besteht aus Aufsätzen und Essays, die dem Thema «Begegnung zwischen der deutschen und polnischen Philosophie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert» gewidmet sind. Viele polnische Philosophen haben an das Ideengut der deutschen Philosophie angeknüpft. In der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts genossen Kant, Hegel und seine Schule in Polen einen großen Ruf. In der zweiten Hälfte des 19.Jhs stand das Thema der Werte und der Philosophie der Kultur im Vordergrund. Mit der durch F. Nietzsche aufgeworfenen Problematik der Notwendigkeit einer (...) radikalen Umwertung aller Werte haben sich in dieser Zeit viele Philosophen in Polen auseinandergesetzt. Im 20. Jahrhundert ist die deutsche Philosophie nicht nur in Ingardens Phänomenologie, sondern auch in der analytischen Philosophie der weltberühmten «Lemberg-Warschauer Schule» und sogar in der katholischen Philosophie von K. Wojtyła und J. Tischner präsent, die an die Philosophie von Kant, Scheler und Heidegger anknüpfen. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the concept of an illocutionary rule - i.e., the rule of the form "X counts as 7 in context C" - and examine the role it plays in explaining the nature of verbal communication and the conventionality of natural languages. My aim is to find a middle ground between John R. Searle's view, according to which every conventional speech act has to be explained in terms of illocutionary rules that underlie its performance, and the view (...) held by Ruth G Millikan, who seems to suggest that the formula "X counts as Y in context C" has no application in our theorizing about human linguistic practice. I claim, namely, that the concept of an illocutionary rule is theoretically useful, though not explanatorily basic. I argue that using the formula "X counts as Y in context C" we can classify illocutionary acts by what Millikan calls their conventional outcomes, and thereby make them susceptible to naturalistic explanation. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to use Marina Sbisà’s idea of interactional negotiation to consider what it is for conversing agents to follow illocutionary conventions or, as John L. Austin would put it, what it is for an illocutionary act to be done as conforming to a convention. The chapter is organized into two parts. In the first one, I use the Austinian notions of uptake and response as well as the Lewisian concept of accommodation to discuss a few (...) examples of force negotiation and develop a model of its underlying mechanisms. In the second part, I suggest that interactional negotiation plays a key role in the functioning of all language conventions—phatic, rhetic, illocutionary, etc.—construed along the Millikanian lines, i.e., as families or lineages of linguistic precedents. My contention is that the ideas I propose in this chapter are compatible with Sbisà’s theory of speech acts and can be regarded as its possible extension. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

This paper discusses three different contemporary uses of philosophy and literature in non-philosophical and non-literary texts. Most often, both discourses are used as tools, and they are invoked instrumentally in popularizing literature or in teaching. Philosophy and literature can also be treated as a source or starting point for reflection outside its mother field, or even as a cause of various social and political processes. The most interesting usage of both discourses is to refer to them as the symptoms or (...) signs of the times allowing us to make diagnoses about the present. These uses of the two discourses show the similarities between literature and philosophy on a purely pragmatic level that is relevant to their contemporary functioning in a non-specialist sphere. The convergence in this regard is a testimony to the transformation of the position of both discourses in the contemporary humanities involving the loss of their privileged position. At the same time, literature and philosophy in this crisis situation are gaining new areas of influence in public discourse, realizing their cognitive and reflexive potential through their utilitarian use. (shrink)

This paper explores the wandering during the Night of Culture, which I consider an essential practice for the people's experience of this event. Looking at this particular form of movement of those participating in this initiative between various event locations also allows us to see the implications of the Night of Culture for urban public spaces. The empirical base of the paper is the visual documentation of the events carried out during the Night of Culture during the 2023 edition. While (...) interpreting the material, I refer to the situationist theory of drift and then reconstruct the structure of the festival's wandering, its rhythm, the type of attention bestowed on the city by the participants, and the form of this ephemeral community. In conclusion, I propose that the atmosphere of places can be used to analyse the city-forming effects of the Night of Culture, to grasp better the specificity of the event and its risks and potentials. (shrink)

The aim of this paper was to analyze the relationship between attitudes toward physical activity and participation in water sports events and to recognize the main motives for involvement in these kinds of events. A written paper–pencil diagnostic survey was conducted among 394 participants in two traditional and two modern sports events on water held in Poland to ascertain whether innovative events are needed in society, and whether they cause an increase in interest in physical activity. The research results showed (...) that modern sports events on water did not have any more power to attract physically inactive people than traditional water events, did not produce a greater desire to lead an active lifestyle, and did not encourage people to more regularly practice water sports. Moreover, modern events, compared to traditional events, were only a one-time experience and the people who completed survey often wanted to return to traditional sports events which provided participants with greater positive emotions than a modern event. In the case of socio-demographical variables, there was no statistically significant relationship between gender and choice of modern or traditional event, but older people were more likely to choose a traditional event than younger people; modern water events were an attractive option primarily for young people under 30 years of age, furthermore, modern events more often attracted people who had completed higher education. However, it turned out that a modern event on water often attracted more people who had had no experience in this sport discipline rather than people who chose traditional water events. In a sense, modern events are therefore effective in promoting water sports in Polish society. We also distinguished five main groups of participants: healthy lifestyle managers, lovers of sports emotions, water sports malcontents, water sports enthusiasts, and neutrals to water sports. Additionally, we looked into gender-related motives for participation in modern and traditional water events: social and health-related motives proved to be more important for women and men who participated in modern water events. The research results presented in the article expand on the current state of knowledge about mass participation in sport, the impact of sporting events on the promotion of physical activity, and show the motivation behind participation in modern and traditional water sporting events. (shrink)

This paper is a reflection on the legitimacy of commonly accepted opposition of the notions of “capitalism” and “socialism”. The leading thesis is that although they can be considered as antinomies, their real referents should not be treated analogously. Capitalism, as understood by its very name, emerged in the second half of the 19th century and evolved constantly from this moment, often changing its main features. Socialism, in contrast, was created as a notion opposing the capitalistic reality of the 19th (...) century. Yet it never really existed in this form. The actual economic system, referred to as “socialism”, was in fact a hybrid of capitalism and neo-feudal bureaucracy. (shrink)

Ivancovsky et al. provide a compelling argument for the role of curiosity in creative thinking. We argue that (a) trait-like curiosity is necessary to engage in creative actions and (b) state-like curiosity might be effectively and strategically induced during interventions. Thus, we posit that curiosity works in an agentic and strategic way in strengthening creativity.

We study the isomorphism relation on Borel classes of locally compact Polish metric structures. We prove that isomorphism on such classes is always classifiable by countable structures (equivalently: Borel reducible to graph isomorphism), which implies, in particular, that isometry of locally compact Polish metric spaces is Borel reducible to graph isomorphism. We show that potentially $\boldsymbol {\Pi }^{0}_{\alpha + 1}$ isomorphism relations are Borel reducible to equality on hereditarily countable sets of rank $\alpha $, $\alpha \geq 2$. We also study (...) approximations of the Hjorth-isomorphism game, and formulate a condition ruling out classifiability by countable structures. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the semantics of the first person pronoun “I” from the perspective of the user/producer distinction. In the first part of the paper, I describe the Simple View and propose three interpretations of its thesis. In the second part, I analyze the notions of use and production of a linguistic token. In the next part, I show that all of the interpretations of SV are sensitive to counterexamples. In the end, I discuss possible answers of the (...) proponents of SV and argue against them. The first aim of this paper is to show that SV is wrong, and the second is to convince the reader that the user/producer distinction is of high importance in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that (...) only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the cases of religious Moorean propositions of the form ‘d, but I don't believe that d’ and ‘d, but I believe that ~d’, where d is a religious dogma, proposition, or part of a creed. I argue that such propositions can be genuinely and rationally asserted and that this fact poses a problem for traditional analysis of religious assertion as an expression of faith and of religious faith as entailing belief. In the article, I explore (...) the possibility of undermining these commonly held assumptions and argue that the assertability of religious Moorean propositions can be justified by an account of faith as an intention to form religious beliefs. In the end, I also consider the consequences of such a stance, especially concerning the debate on the ethics of religious belief and doxastic voluntarism. (shrink)

In this paper we present a solution to Saul Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief Meaning and use, Dordrecht, 1979) based on Kaplan’s metaphysical picture of words. Although it is widely accepted that providing such a solution was one of the main incentives for the development of Kaplan’s theory, it was never presented by Kaplan in a systematic manner and was regarded by many as unsatisfactory. We agree with these critiques, and develop an extension of Kaplan’s theory by introducing the notion of (...) “conservative” word uses, as well as arguing for the restriction of Kripke’s Disquotational Principle only to such uses. This restriction allows us to solve Kripke’s Puzzle by arguing that the assent of the puzzle’s protagonist does not allow disquotation and ascription of corresponding inconsistent belief, as it contains the non-conservative use of a proper name. At the end of the paper, we defend two of Kaplan’s theses that we find essential for our argument to work: that individuation of word tokens involves taking into account the intention of the speaker, and that different uniquely referring proper names of the same shape should be regarded as different homonymous words. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of faultless disagreement for predicates of taste may be fruitfully explained by appealing to the vagueness of predicates of taste and the epistemicist reading of vagueness as defended by Timothy Williamson (1994). I begin by arguing that this position is better suited to explain both the “faultless” and “disagreement” intuition. The first is explained here by appealing to the necessary ignorance of the predicate’s boundaries and a plausible account of constitutive norms of (...) taste assertions, while the second by insisting on classical, absolutist semantics for judgments containing predicates of taste. Furthermore, I analyze the arguments against the reading of taste predicates as vague based on the alleged epistemic privilege concerning one’s taste and on the lack of definite cases. Responding to these objections, I develop a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, comment on the assumed epistemic privilege concerning taste ascriptions and provide a more detailed account of sources of the vagueness of predicates of personal taste, which I dub “super-vagueness.”. (shrink)

The paper develops a non-Gricean account of accommodation: a contextadjusting process guided by the assumption that the speaker’s utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move. The paper is organized into three parts. The first one reconstructs the basic tenets of Lepore and Stone's non-Gricean model of meaningmaking, which results from integrating direct intentionalism and extended semantics. The second part discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in conversational practice. The third part uses the tenets of the non-Gricean model of meaning-making (...) to account for the discursive mechanisms underlying accommodation; the proposed account relies on a distinction between the rules of appropriateness, which form part of extendedgrammar, and the Maxim of Appropriateness, which functions as a discursive norm guiding our conversational practice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts (...) into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem. (shrink)

This chapter explores the axiological convergence between classical liberalism and Catholic Social Thought (CST). The chapter argues that CST and classical liberals should build on their complementary values to strengthen public support for liberal democracy and a free-market economy among Catholic voters and in society at large. Although populist regimes, especially far-right conservative nationalists, portray liberalism as an antithesis of Catholicism, this chapter shows that there is a broad consensus between the two traditions. Contrary to far-right populist positions, the chapter (...) argues that it is possible to maintain Catholic values in a liberal market democracy without denouncing one’s religious identity. The chapter emphasizes the importance of re-constructing a centrist tradition of Catholic liberal thought to mitigate populist assault on political, economic, and social freedoms. (shrink)

The obligation of the legalization of entrepreneurial activity from Article 14 of The Act of July 2, 2004 on the freedom of entrepreneurial activity caused deliberations regarding constitutive or declarative character of the legalization entry and as a result, created a problem with indication of the moment when the public law status of an entrepreneur is acquired. The answer to the question whether Central Register and Information of Entrepreneurial Activity or the register of entrepreneurs of the National Court Register have (...) also the creation function incites many controversies and is subject to discussions, in the process of which two main standpoints were formed. It is also important to note that the resolution of the discussed issue not only holds scientific value, but above all, it has significant importance in practice. Therefore, it is necessary and even essential. Furthermore, it is typical for this issue that concerns related thereto and arguments raised during the discussion have their basis in the legislation in force and in fact, encapsulate the favoured path of its interpretation. (shrink)

There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim , from there to a modal claim , and from there to a metaphysical claim.